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Abstract 
The dependability issue including fault tolerance and 
security is a basic stumbling block to the practical and 
commercial application of the mobile code technology. 
This short paper introduces the SeCode approach to 
fault-tolerant and secure execution of mobile code. The 
research focus is on the development of a method and an 
architectural framework to support mobile code against 
unintentional/intentional faults and malicious attacks 
from its operating environment. The proposed approach 
makes no assumption about the operating environment 
(i.e. remote hosts) for mobile code. It integrates work on 
fault tolerance and security within a well-defined formal 
system model, and offers a powerful ability to detect and 
identify faulty hosts and malicious attacks by means of 
redundant data structures with advanced fault diagnosis 
and cryptography techniques.  
1. Introduction 
Traditionally, security models, fault tolerance and 
security policies for large distributed systems have taken 
a “host-central” view so that the emphasis has been on 
protecting hosts, and making hosts reliable and fault-
tolerant. This has worked very well for traditional client-
server models, but is no longer adequate for envisaged 
approaches for the next generation of distributed 
computing based on mobile code. In a mobile code 
system, protection and fault tolerance must be provided 
for both hosts and mobile code. Especially, effective and 
feasible solutions must be developed to protect mobile 
code against malicious attacks from hosts. 
With mobile code, we aim to move the code so that it 
is local to the associated resources needed. The gain is in 
terms of performance (locality), late binding, 
reconfiguration (resource location is not built into the 
application) and scalability. Specific application 
examples include mobile e-commerce, online purchasing 
and delivery, and Web access for retrieval of real-time 
information such as stock quotes, flight and reservation 
information, navigational maps, and weather reports. 
However, if mobile code is to be used for serious 
industrial applications, it is imperative that security and 
fault tolerance architectures are used a priori, otherwise 
users will not be able to trust the system [6].  
There are in general two categories of research issues 
related to mobile code fault tolerance and security: i) 
protecting hosts against malicious and/or faulty mobile 
code, and ii) protecting mobile code against malicious 
and/or faulty hosts. Considerable efforts have been 
focused on the former problem, while the latter is still not 
well understood. Existing approaches and techniques for 
protecting code are limited to several separate areas such 
as tamper/failure detection, fault-tolerant execution and 
privacy preservation [2].  
Fault-tolerant mobile code systems are usually based on 
replication and voting techniques to mask the effects of 
faulty or malicious hosts, and use cryptography techniques 
(e.g. digital signatures and the secret sharing scheme) to 
maintain the confidentiality of mobile code, authenticate 
their origin, and verify their integrity [3][4][9]. Most of 
existing solutions require the provision of system-level 
mechanisms (e.g. those supporting replication, reliable 
detection, and voting) at each remote host [5][7][8]. They 
generally do not scale well and thereby are not applicable 
in actual settings, such as the Internet. 
In reality, the operating environment for mobile code is 
often large-scale and potentially non-trustworthy [6]. We 
have been developing a new approach, named SeCode, 
that does not require any system-level support for 
replication, detection and voting at any remote host. Our 
approach can detect corrupted results and reconstruct the 
expected results out of a threshold number of correct 
pieces of results, thereby tolerating faults and/or attacks 
from malicious remote hosts. 
2. The SeCode Approach 
Mobile code is defined here as executable code which 
is dispatched, which uses remote resources, and which 
reports back on its results. We consider a large-scale and 
dynamic network environment composed with a large 
number of hosts. Those hosts may provide high-level 
services, including information databases, interfaces to 
intelligent devices (e.g. sensors and display), and 
brokering services. Suppose that a local host (the origin) 
containing a user application needs remote resources. It 
therefore dispatches executable code to a set of m remote 
hosts, denoted by H = {H1, H2, …, Hm}, to acquire the 
resources. Special services provided by our SeCode 
system will split the user request R at the local host into k 
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sub-requests, which are independent from each other. 
These sub-requests contain some redundancy so that any 
k - t out of k sub-requests are mathematically equivalent 
to the original request R (where t is the threshold number 
of faults and/or attacks). Instead of dispatching a single 
piece of mobile code, the system will send k pieces of the 
code, denoted by C = {C1, C2, …, Ck}, that carry the sub-
requests respectively to remote hosts. The expected 
results for the request R can be derived from the results 
returned as long as at least k - t sub-requests have been 
met, thereby effectively tolerating faults and/or attacks 
from malicious remote hosts.  
The information resources (e.g. databases) at remote 
hosts can be modelled in different ways. We start with a 
simple model used in [1] and view the resources available 
at each remote host Hj as a binary string of length kj.  
These strings are represented as follows: 
 
 
 
The user application at the local host first creates an 
index set i = {i1, i2, … , im}, where ij  {1, 2, …, kj} and  
j = 1, 2, …, m. The index ij is used to indicate the user’s 
interest in the specific value of the bit xjij at the host Hj. 
For the purpose of fault tolerance and security, the 
system also uses a set of random numbers, r = {r1, r2, …, 
rm} where rj is of length L
rj and j = 1, 2, …, m, to produce 
a set of queries, Q = {Q1, Q2, …, Qm}. In particular, for a 
given remote host Hj, k sub-queries are generated based 
on the index ij and the random number rj, that is, 
 
 
 
 
For a given piece of code Ci, m sub-queries, {Q
1
i, Q
2
i, 
…, Qmi} where i = 1, 2, …, k, are carried and executed at 
m remote hosts respectively. All the answers returned 
from the remote hosts can be represented as follows: 
 
 
 
 
It is important to notice that for a given Aj, there are in 
fact k candidate answers available. The intended result 
can be derived from the k answers, provided that at least 
k – t candidate answers contain the correct results. In 
other words, our system is designed to tolerate up to t 
faults and/or attacks. For each of m remote hosts, the 
intended and final answer can be reconstructed using the 
following reconstruction functions:  
 
 
 
3. The SeCode System Architecture 
Figure 1 outlines an architectural framework for our 
system. Any host that sends mobile code to remote hosts 
contains four key components (or services). The request 
manager is responsible for generating sub-requests from a 
user request, and the mobile code dispatcher is responsible 
for producing the corresponding pieces of the code and 
sending them to remote hosts. The mobile code collector 
will collect the returning objects and results, and the result 
manager will finally reconstruct the desirable results based 
on all the information and data back from remote hosts, 
and perform a diagnosis algorithm for identifying faulty 
hosts and malicious attacks.  
Figure 1. The SeCode System Architecture 
We have taken a system approach rather than a 
programming language approach. Our strategy is to build 
fault tolerance and security into the system (or platform) 
and applications themselves, rather than attempt to 
introduce reliability and security patches afterward. The 
development of a sound architectural framework is the 
essential part of our approach. Within this framework, the 
infrastructure services (e.g. fault tolerance and security) 
will be provided and incorporated into mobile code 
platforms so as to facilitate the fault-tolerant and secure 
execution of mobile code.  
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